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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. §77-35-26(2)(a) (1953 as amended) and Utah Code Ann.
§78-29-3(2)(e) (1953 as amended) whereby a defendant in a District
Court criminal action may take an appeal to the Court of Appeals
from a final judgment of conviction of any crime other than a first
degree or capital felony.

In this case, the Honorable Pat B. Brian,

Judge, Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County,
State of Utah, rendered final judgment and conviction for Theft, a
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-404 (1953
as amended).

(See Addendum A.)
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TEXT OF STATUTES
Rule 609.

Impeachment by evidence of conviction of crime.

(a) General rule. For the purpose of attacking the
credibility of a witness, evidence that he has been convicted of a
crime shall be admitted if elicited from him or established by
public record during cross-examination but only if the crime (1) was
punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the
law which he was convicted, and the court determines that the
probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial
effect to the defendant, or (2) involved dishonesty or false
statement, regardless of the punishment.
Utah Code Ann. §77-35-17(j).
(j) At each recess of the court, whether the jurors are
permitted to separate or are sequestered, they shall be admonished
by the court that it is their duty not to converse among themselves
or to converse with, or suffer themselves to be addressed by, any
other person on any subject of the trial, and that it is their duty
not to form or express an opinion thereon until the case is finally
submitted to them.
Otah Code Ann. S77-35-18(e)(14 ).
(14) That a state of mind exists on the part of the
juror with reference to the cause, or to either party, which will
prevent him from acting impartially and without prejudice to the
substantial rights of the party challenging; but no person shall be
disqualified as a juror by reason of having formed or expressed an
opinion upon the matter or cause to be submitted to such jury,
founded upon public rumor, statements in public journals or common
notoriety, if it satisfactorily appears to the court that the juror
can and will, notwithstanding such opinion, act impartially and
fairly upon the matter to be submitted to him.

vii.

TEXT OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 7:
Sec. 7 [Due process of law.]
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property,
without due process of law.
Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 12:
Sec. 12 [Rights of accused persons.]
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right
to appear and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature
and cause of the accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to
testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against
him, to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of
witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by an
impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is
alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all
cases. In no instance shall any accused person, before final
judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure the rights
herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to give
evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify
against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any
person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.
United States Constitution, Fifth Amendment:
AMENDMENT V.
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a
Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or
in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public
danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.

viii.

United States Constitution, Sixth Amendment:
AMENDMENT VI.
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the
State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed,
which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the
Assistance of counsel for his defense.
United States Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment:
AMENDMENT XIV.
Section 1.
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

ix.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSOES
1.

Did the trial court commit prejudicial error when it

denied Mr. Brown's motion to exclude three prior theft convictions?
2.

Does the Utah and/or United States Constitution

require a new trial when a juror fails to truthfully answer a
material voir dire question?
3.

Does the Utah and/or United States Constitution

require a new trial when jurors deliberate about the case before it
is actually submitted to them?

x.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
v.
DAVID E. BROWN,

Case No. 870504-CA

Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This appeal is from a judgment of conviction against
David E. Brown for Theft, a third degree felony, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-404 (1953 as amended).

See Addendum A.

A jury

found Mr. Brown guilty following a trial on September 16, 1987, in
the Third District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah,
the Honorable Pat B. Brian, Judge, presiding.

The Court sentenced

Mr. Brown to a prison term of zero to five years with an
accompanying fine of $5,000.00. The Court suspended the fine and
the prison term and placed Mr. Brown on probation for a period of
eighteen months.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
David E. Brown was arrested and charged with the July 28,
1987, theft of a case of cigarettes valued at over $250.00 from the
Farmer Jack's grocery store located at 20 East 900 South in Salt
Lake City (R. 13). Mr. Brown pleaded not guilty to the third

degree theft charge on August 21, 1987, and his case was set for
trial on September 16, 1987, with a pretrial conference scheduled
for September 11, 1987 (R. 15).
Mr. Brown filed a motion in limine to exclude three prior
convictions prior to the scheduled pretrial conference (R. 16-43).
The motion was argued on September 11, 1987 (R. 154 at pp. 1-7) and
taken under advisement by the court (R. 46). Prior to trial on
September 16, 1987, the motion was renewed and the court denied the
motion (R. 155 at pp. 3-15).

The court indicated that the prior

crimes of theft were crimes of dishonesty and they would be
admissible because they were relevant to the credibility of Mr.
Brown (R. 15). As a result of the trial court's ruling that the
state could impeach Mr. Brown through the use of his three prior
misdemeanor theft convictions, Mr. Brown did not testify (R. 14).
Mr. Brown's trial lasted one day (R. 155). The evidence
consisted of three witnesses who testified for the State that Mr.
Brown was removing a case of cigarettes from the store when
apprehended (R. 155 at 55-87).

At least one of the witnesses

acknowledged that at the time Mr. Brown was apprehended, he stated
that he was not outside the store (R. 155 at 80). After the state
rested, Mr. Brown moved to dismiss the charge but that motion was
denied (R. 155 at p. 90). The court then instructed the jury and
they retired to deliberate (R. 155 at p. 92).
During the course of jury deliberations the jury foreman
sent a note to the trial court (R. 87). The note stated, "Does
statements made by jurors during recess that disturbed some members
render our verdict invalid?"

(R. 87, 155 at p. 92). The jury

returned to the courtroom where the judge admonished the jurors to
- 2 -

decide the case solely on the law and the evidence presented in the
courtroom (R. 155 at 93). The jury continued deliberations,
Mr* Brown requested that the court inquire of the jurors
whether the statements had to do with discussing the case. The
court refused and then Mr. Brown moved for a mistrial (R. 155 at p.
94).

That motion for a mistrial was denied (R. 155 at p. 95).
The jury returned and found Mr. Brown guilty of theft as

charged in the information (R. 155 at p. 96). The trial court
polled the jury and asked each juror the question, "was your verdict
in this case influenced by anything other than the evidence
presented in this courtroom and the law given you by the court?11
(R. 155 at pp. 96-97).

Each juror answered, No (Id.).

A motion for a new trial was filed along with two
affidavits detailing that Juror David Hogan had exhibited prejudice
and a predisposed attitude of guilt towards Mr. Brown (R. 130-33,
138-39).

Mr. Hogan's display had occurred prior to jury

deliberations during a recess in the proceedings (R. 87). The
record is devoid of the usual admonitions required by Utah Code Ann.
§77-35-17(j) (1953 as amended).
The motion for a new trial was also based on the
affidavit of Juror Alan Blain (R. 138-39) which implied that Juror
Hogan had failed to truthfully answer a voir dire question regarding
his prior employment at a retail store.
The trial court denied the motion for a new trial (R.
152-53), and this appeal followed.
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Mr. Brown's three prior convictions for misdemeanor theft
were not crimes of dishonesty or false statement and should have
been excluded.

The court erroneously denied his motion allowing

their admission if he decided to testify.

That decision effectively

and prejudicially kept Mr. Brown from testifying in his own behalf.
The failure of Juror Hogan to truthfully answer a voir
dire question denied Mr. Brown his right to a fair trial and an
impartial jury as guaranteed by both the state and federal
constitutions.
Mr. Brown's right to be tried by an impartial jury was
violated when jurors engaged in pre-submission deliberations
contrary to the constitutions of Utah and the United States.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN
MR. BROWN'S PRE-TRIAL MOTION TO EXCLUDE
EVIDENCE OF HIS PRIOR CONVICTIONS.
Prior to trial Mr. Brown moved the trial court to exclude
his three prior theft convictions, all Class A Misdemeanors (R. 154,
155 pp. 1-15).

The trial court denied the motion finding that:

Petty theft or shoplift, even though identical or
similar crimes to the one for which the defendant is
being tried, should be admitted and scrutinized very
carefully by the trial court, are in fact crimes of
dishonesty, and that the State will be permitted to
question the defendant regarding conviction of those
crimes, because they go to the very question of the
credibility of the defendant (R. 155 at p. 15).
The trial court committed error in ruling that thefts are crimes of
dishonesty or false statement under Rule 609(a)(2) of the Utah Rules
- 4 -

of Evidence (1983).

The trial court's error was prejudicial to Mr.

Brown because the admission of the prior theft convictions, inasmuch
as they were identical to the crime charged, strategically prevented
Mr. Brown from taking the stand and testifying in his own defense.1
On April 13, 1983, the Utah Supreme Court adopted new
evidence rules, including Rule 609. The new rules were patterned
after the federal rules of evidence and became effective in Utah
courts on September 1, 1983. The committee! promulgating the new
rules stated as their purpose to seek uniformity in the rules of
evidence between the federal and Utah rules. Boyce, Utah Rules of
Evidence 1983, 85 Utah L. Rev. 64. The Utah Supreme Court agreed,
stating that the adoption of the rules indicated a "fresh start" for
the law of evidence in Utah.
(Utah 1986).

State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325, 1333

The Court further instructed that the new rules were

to be guided by federal case law for interpretations, and that the
new rules would supplant all inconsistent rules and statutes.
Banner, 717 P.2d 1334 n. 40.
Rule 609(a) is a verbatim repliba of the federal
counterpart and speaks directly to the issue of impeachment by prior
convictions.

The Rule states:

Rule 609. impeachment by evidence of conviction of
crime. (a) General rule. For the purpose of
attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence
that he has been convicted of a crime shall be
admitted if elicited from him o'r established by
public record during cross-examination but only if

1 Mr. Brown's case pre-dates the Utah Supreme Court's recent
ruling in State v. Gentry, 747 P.2d 1032, 1036 (Utah 1987),
holding prospectively that a defendant must take the stand to
preserve this claim for appeal. Accordingly, Mr. Brown's claim
is viable and properly presented before this Court.
- 5 -

the crime (1) was punishable by death or
imprisonment in excess of one year under the law
which he was convicted, and the court determines
that the probative value of admitting this evidence
outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant,
or (2) involved dishonest or false statement,
regardless of the punishment.
Subsection (2) of Rule 609(a) allows the admission of any prior
conviction, regardless of the punishment, jJE the crime involved
dishonesty or false statement.

Subsection (1) of the rule allows

the admission of felony convictions only after the court performs a
balancing test of the probative value of the evidence as against its
prejudicial effect to the accused.
Mr. Brown's prior convictions are for misdemeanors and
thereby subject to admission only under the subsection (2) theory.
The Utah Supreme Court has not yet authored an opinion on the
definition of "crimes of dishonesty or false statement" since having
adopted the new rules.2

However, ample federal case law exists for

guidance on the proper interpretation of "dishonesty" and "false
statement."

2

This issue is currently before the Otah Supreme Court in State v.
Bruce, Case No. 860325, (argued February 8, 1988).
In State v. Cintron, 680 P.2d 33 (Utah 1984), the Court issued a
per curiam opinion concluding that theft impliedly involves
dishonesty. However, Cintron was decided under the old rules of
evidence, Rule 21, and that position is contrary to the current
direction and fresh start of the new rules. Moreover, Cintron is
unsupported and remains inconsistent with the purpose of the current
rules as well as case precedents. In State v. Banner, 717 P.2d at
1334 n.40, the Utah Supreme Court indicated that to the extent
previous opinions are inconsistent with the new direction taken by
the Utah Rules of Evidence, they should be overruled. Cintron is
old law and should play no role in the decision now before this
Court.

- 6 -

In United States v. Smith, 551 F.2d 348 (D.C. Cir. 1976),
which the Utah Supreme Court cited favorably in its recent 609(a)(1)
State v. Banner decision, the circuit court discussed in detail the
legislative history of Rule 609(a) pointing out the heated debate
which spawned the formulation of the rule*

That court quoted the

Conference Committee Report which stated:
By the phrase "dishonesty and false statement" the
Conference means crimes such as perjury or
subornation of perjury, false pretense, or any
fraud, embezzlement, or false pretense, or any other
offense in the nature of crimen falsi, the
commission of which involves some element of deceit,
untruthfulness, or falsification bearing on the
accused's propensity to testify truthfully.
United States v. Smith, 551 P.2d at 362 (quoting H.R. Conf. Rep. No.
93-1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 9, reprinted in [1974] U.S. Code Cong.
& Admin. News, pp. 7098, 7103).

Footnote 26 of the Smith opinion

discussed in detail the history of crimen falsi concluding that
crimes of the type that Mr. Brown previously had been convicted of
committing would not qualify under the crimen falsi designation.
Id. at 362-63.
Another opinion from the same circuit gave further light
on what Congress' intent was with regards to Rule 609(a)(2).

In a

statement from the court in United States v. Millings, 535 F.2d 121
(D.C. Cir. 1976), which is also applicable to the prior theft
convictions of Mr. Brown, the court reasoned:
Although it may be argued that any wilful violation
of law . . . evinces a lack of character and a
disregard for all legal duties, including the
obligations of an oath, Congress has not accepted
that expansive theory.

- 7 -

535 F.2d at 123. The intent of Congress was to limit the
introduction of prior convictions for impeachment purposes only to
those crimes which bear directly on a witness' propensity to not
tell the truth.

Otherwise, one could argue, as discounted in

Millings, that any crime could be introduced to impeach.

As the

Millings court unequivocally stated, Congress simply did not intend
to adopt such an expansive position.

The prior theft convictions of

Mr. Brown do not bear on his propensity to tell or not tell the
truth; they show no deceit or dishonesty as meant by Congress.
In United States v. Glenn, 667 F.2d 1269 (9th Cir. 1982),
the court held that the crimes of burglary and grand theft were not
admissible under Rule 609(a)(2) without a showing of accompanying
fraudulent or deceitful conduct.
make such a showing.

The burden rests with the State to

Generally, the court observed that crimes of

violence, theft crimes (as in the case at bar), and crimes of
stealth do not involve "dishonesty or false statement" within the
proper meaning of Rule 609(a)(2).
Similarly, the Fifth Circuit held that a prior conviction
for felony theft could not be used for impeachment purposes under
Rule 609(a)(2) because a prior theft does not bear upon a witness's
propensity to testify truthfully.

The court stated that felony

theft (prior convictions of theft in the case at bar) does not
involve "dishonesty or false statement" of the
credibility-deteriorating quality contemplated by Rule 609(a)(2).
Howard v. Gonzales, 658 F.2d 352 (5th Cir. 1981).

- 8 -

The only Utah opinion discussing whether theft and
burglary are crimes of dishonesty or false statement within the
meaning of Rule 609(a)(2) is Judge Jackson's dissenting opinion in
State v. Morehouse, 748 P.2d 217, 222 n.2 (Utah App. 1988) (Jackson,
J. dissenting).

While the majority in Morehouse does not address

the Rule 609(a)(2) issue, the dissent in footnote 2, adopts the
above described line of cases and remains the only authoritative
discussion of the (a)(2) question by a Utah Court.

Because Mr.

Brown's prior misdemeanor convictions for shoplifting do not amount
to crimes of dishonesty or false statement, the trial court erred in
denying defense counsel's motion to suppress.
The trial court's error in denying Mr. Brown's motion to
suppress his prior convictions resulted in prejudice to Mr. Brown.
The appropriate standard for review is whether "there was 'a
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result for the
defendant'."
omitted).

State v. Gentry, 747 P.2d at 1038 (citations

In Gentry, the Utah Supreme Court determined that there

was "a reasonable likelihood that the result would have been
different had defendant's prior convictionis been excluded and had
defendant taken the stand."

Id.

The Court pointed out that had

Gentry taken the stand, he might have convinced the jury that the
testimony of one of the witnesses was not true.

In the instant

case, the same reasoning is applicable; had Mr. Brown taken the
stand, he might have been able to satisfactorily explain his actions
or establish that details in the witnesses' testimony were incorrect.

- 9 -

However, because the court permitted the state to impeach his
testimony through three identical convictions, Mr. Brown did not
testify.
In State v. Banner, the Utah Supreme Court acknowledged
that where the prior convictions are similar to those charged, the
probative value of such convictions will rarely outweigh the
prejudicial effect.

Banner at 1334, n.44.

In Banner, the Utah

Supreme Court reiterated:
Consideration of the testimony's prejudicial effect
is especially pertinent when the witness is the
defendant in a criminal prosecution . . . This is
particularly important when, as here, the prior
conviction is for the same type of crime involved in
the matter under present consideration. In this
type of situation, the probative value of the
evidence as affecting the party's credibility will
rarely outweigh the resulting confusion of the
issues in dispute and the prejudice to the party.
Banner at 1334 n. 44 (emphasis altered) (quoting Terry v. ZCMI, 605
P.2d 314, 325 (Utah 1979)).
Counsel for Mr. Brown repeatedly indicated the need to
know, pre-trial, whether the prior convictions would be allowed so
that she and Mr. Brown could determine if he would testify in his
own behalf (R. 155 at pp. 11-14).

When the trial court erroneously

admitted the prior convictions as crimes of dishonesty going to
credibility, Mr. Brown was prejudiced and felt he could not then
take the stand.

Accordingly, this Court should find reversible

error and remand this case for a new trial with prior convictions
excluded.

- 10 -

POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR
IN DENYING MR. BROWNfS MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL
WHEN IT WAS LEARNED THAT A JUROR FAILED TO
TRUTHFULLY ANSWER A MATERIAL VOIR DIRE QUESTION.
A.

THE FAILURE OF A JUROR TO TRUTHFULLY ANSWER
A MATERIAL VOIR DIRE QUESTION VIOLATED
MR. BROWN'S RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL BY AN
IMPARTIAL JURY UNDER THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION.

The sixth and fourteenth amendments to the United States
Constitution guarantee to every person accused of a crime the right
to trial by an impartial jury.

Additionally, the fifth and

fourteenth amendments support this right to an impartial jury by
mandating that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law.

These rights were denied Mr.

Brown during his trial when Juror No. 17, David Hogan, failed to
affirmatively respond to a voir dire inquiry of whether he had ever
worked in retail sales (R. 155 at pp. 36-38).

Juror Hogan

exacerbated his failure to truthfully answer the query, and thus
unveiled his error, when he later argued to fellow jurors this
undiscovered retail sales experience (R. 138-39, Affidavit of Juror
Alan Blain).

See Addendum B.

These events prejudiced Mr. Brown because without a
truthful answer to the voir dire, Mr. Brown was unable to exercise a
challenge for cause (or alternatively a peremptory challenge) of
Juror Hogan.
Once this information was discovered, Mr. Brown asserted
to the trial court that his constitutionally guaranteed rights to an
impartial jury had been violated, and he requested his conviction be
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quashed and a new trial ordered (R. 130-31, 156 at pp. 3, 9-13).
The trial court committed prejudicial error when it denied that
motion for a new trial (R. 152-53, 156 at pp. 30-31).
In McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S.
548 (1984), the United States Supreme Court established the
requirements for granting a new trial where a juror fails to answer
voir dire questions.

The McDonough Court held that before a new

trial may be obtained because of a juror's failure to respond
affirmatively to a voir dire question, the movant must demonstrate:
(1) that the juror failed to answer honestly a material question,
and (2) that a correct response would have provided a valid basis
for a challenge for cause.

Id.

at 556.

Several cases illustrate

and extend this rule.
In People v. Diaz, 200 Cal. Rptr. 77 (Cal. App. 1984), a
defendant on trial for assault with a deadly weapon discovered
during the trial that a juror failed to disclose during voir dire
that she had been assaulted at knife-point during an attempted
rape.

The trial court would not grant a mistrial or a new trial.

On appeal the defendant claimed a denial of his right to an
impartial and unbiased jury.

The court reversed the conviction

Where a party has examined the jurors concerning
their qualifications during voir dire and any of
them have failed to respond truthfully, it is
manifest he has been deprived of his right to
challenge for cause, and has been deceived into
foregoing his right of peremptory challenge.
. . . The denial of the right to reasonably
exercise a peremptory challenge, be it by either the
trial court or a juror through concealing material
facts, is not a mere matter of procedure, but the
deprivation of an absolute and substantial right
historically designed as one of the chief safeguards
of a defendant against an unlawful conviction.
- 12 -

Diaz, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 81.
In United States v. Bynum, 634 F.2d 768 (4th Cir. 1980),
the federal court of appeals found that a juror's failure to
affirmatively respond to a voir dire question regarding whether a
close family relative had ever been convicted of a crime, when two
family members had been convicted, violated the defendant's right to
intelligently exercise a peremptory challenge to remove the juror.
Finally, the Colorado Court of Appeals, in People v.
Borrelli, 624 P.2d 900 (Colo. App. 1980), observed that:
[t]he failure of a juror during voi[r] dire to
answer material questions truthfully, if discovered
during a trial, may justify the removal of that
juror and replacement with an alternate or may
justify declaring a mistrial. If the lack of candor
on the part of the juror is not discovered until
after the trial, it may justify the granting of a
new trial. A defendant has the right to exercise
all of his peremptory challenges, and when a juror
misrepresents or conceals material and relevant
matters, that right, as well as the right to
challenge for cause, is impaired.
Id. at 903 (citations omitted; emphasis added).

The Borrelli court

set aside the conviction and ordered a new trial expressly because
the defendant's right to make an intelligent decision regarding
whether to challenge for cause, use a peremptory, or accept a juror
had been denied.

Id.

In the instant case, the trial court asked several times
whether any of the jurors had ever worked in the retail sales
business (R. 155 at pp. 36-38).
remained silent.

Id.

See Addendum C.

Juror Hogan

Yet, once impaneled and deliberating as a
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juror he referred the other jurors to previous experiences he had
while employed in a retail store (R. 138-39, Affidavit of Juror Alan
Blain).

See Addendum B.
The crime charged against Mr, Brown was Retail Theft.

Accordingly, the questioning as to whether anyone had ever worked in
a retail store of any kind was material. An affirmative answer to
the question (or to any of the followup questions), would have been
grounds upon which a challenge for cause, or a peremptory challenge,
or at the very least further questioning could have been made so
that those choices could have been intelligently considered and
acted upon.
When Juror Hogan remained silent, as the case law
indicates, Mr. Brown's constitutionally protected rights to an
impartial jury and a fair trial were denied him.

The failure of the

trial court to adhere to the federal constitution and grant a new
trial was prejudicial error.

Accordingly, this Court should reverse

the conviction and remand for a new trial.
B.

THE FAILURE OF A JUROR TO TRUTHFULLY ANSWER A
MATERIAL VOIR DIRE QUESTION VIOLATED MR. BROWNfS
RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL BY AN IMPARTIAL JURY
UNDER THE UTAH CONSTITUTION.

Article I, Section 12 of the Constitution of Utah
explicitly assures that the criminally accused shall have the right
to a trial by an impartial jury.
Constitution of Utah requires that

Article I, Section 7 of the
ff

[n]o person shall be deprived of

life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."
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While Utah has not specifically addressed the state
constitutional issue, it is fair to conclude that Utah's protections
extend at least as far as the federal constitution does since the
language of the two constitutions are similar.

Accordingly, Mr.

Brown adopts the arguments of subpoint "A" of this point as equally
persuasive for Utah's constitutional interpretation.
In State v. Pike, 712 P.2d 277 (Utah 1985), the Utah
Supreme Court examined the issue of incidental contact during the
trial between witnesses and jurors. The Court pointed out that both
the Utah and United States Constitutions guarantee trial by an
impartial jury.

Yet, while some jurisdictions hold that

conversations between jurors and witnesses are not fatal flaws in
the process unless the defendant can show actual prejudice resulted,
our Supreme Court has established greater protections for the right
to an impartial jury by enunciating "a more stringent rule in
recognition of the fact that prejudice may well exist even though it
is not provable and even though a person who has been tainted may
not, himself, be able to recognize that fact."

Pike at 279-80.

Accord State v. Erickson, 749 P.2d 620, 621 (Utah 1987).

The Utah

Supreme Court has placed the burden on the prosecution, not the
defendant, and the presumption is one of prejudice.

Id.

By analogy, Mr. Brown asserts that the Utah Constitution
extends even greater protection into the area of jurors failing to
honestly answer voir dire questions. As this question again is one
of jury impartiality, the presumption ought again to be one of
prejudice as in Pike.
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Still additional support buttresses Mr. Brown's claim.
Rule 18 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure outlines the reasons
for which a juror may be challenged for cause. The Rules states in
pertinent part:
(14) That a state of mind exists on the part of the
juror with reference to the cause, or to either
party, which will prevent him from acting
impartially and without prejudice to the substantial
rights of the party challenging. . . .
Utah Code Ann. §77-35-18(e)(14) (1953 as amended).

Had Juror Hogan

answered the voir dire question truthfully he very well may have fit
within this subsection allowing dismissal for cause.

At the very

least, a truthful answer from Juror Hogan would have allowed
follow-up questioning which might have either clarified a challenge
for cause or allowed Mr. Brown his protected right to utilize a
peremptory challenge.
Inasmuch as Juror Hogan did not truthfully answer a
material voir dire question put to him by the trial court, Mr. Brown
was denied his right to an impartial jury under the Utah
Constitution.

The trial court therefore erred in failing to grant

the requested motion for a new trial. Accordingly, this Court
should vacate the conviction of Mr. Brown and remand the case for a
new trial.
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POINT III,
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN
DENYING MR. BROWN'S MOTIONS FOR MISTRIAL AND
NEW TRIAL WHEN IT WAS LEARNED THAT JURORS
DELIBERATED BEFORE THE CASE WAS SUBMITTED TO THEM.
A.

THE EARLY DELIBERATION VIOLATED MR. BROWN'S
RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL BY AN IMPARTIAL JURY
UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES.

The fifth, sixth, and fourteenth amendments to the United
States Constitution combine to assure that each and every criminal
defendant is afforded the right to have his case tried before an
impartial jury.

Whenever jurors begin deliberations prior to the

end of trial the constitutional guarantees of an impartial jury are
violated.

In addition to the presubmission deliberations, the trial

court erred in failing to admonish the jury not to discuss the case
among themselves prior to its being submitted to them for
deliberation.
Shortly after the trial court submitted the case to the
jury for deliberation, the jury sent a note to the court which read,
"Does statements made by jurors during recess that disturbed some
members render our verdict invalid?" (R. 155 at p. 92). The trial
court had the jury returned to the courtroom and admonished them to
decide the case solely on the law given by the court and on the
evidence presented (R. 155 at pp. 92-93).

The jury was then

returned to the jury room to deliberate further.
Mr. Brown moved the trial court to make an inquiry into
the pre-submission deliberations and for a mistrial when the court
refused to inquire in the pre-submission statements (R. 155 at pp.
93-94).

The trial court denied the motions (R. 155 at p. 95). The
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jury subsequently returned with a verdict of guilty (R. 155 at 96).
Mr. Brown later filed a motion for a new trial (R. 130-31), and then
orally argued before the trial court (R. 156 at pp. 3-4, 11-23).
Mr. Brown supported his motion with affidavits alleging
that jurors had conversed among themselves and that Juror Hogan had
made prejudicial statements against the defendant during a recess
before the close of the case (R. 132-33, 138-39).

The affidavit of

Juror Blain alleges, inter alia, that "statements were made during a
recess that created an atmosphere of prejudice against defendant."
(R. 138-9).

The affidavit alleged specifically that a woman juror

commented that the defense attorney did not appear worried and that
Juror Hogan responded, "Well, that guy doesn't matter," and referred
to him as "that black man." (R. 138-39).

Additionally, the record

reflects a concern regarding a "Book 'em Danno" comment and
statements and attitudes of Juror Hogan who appeared to have
predetermined the defendant's guilt (R. 156 at p. 7, 138-39).
In State v. Washington, 438 A.2d 1144, 1148 (Conn. 1980),
the Supreme Court of Connecticut expressed that "[djeliberations may
commence only after all the evidence has been presented, final
arguments of counsel have been made, and the trial court has charged
the jury on the law."

After detailing the pitfalls of premature

deliberations, the Washington court found constitutional violations
of both a due process nature and the right to an impartial jury
where the trial court had permitted jurors to deliberate early.
at 1147.
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Id.

In Morrow v. United States, 408 F.2d 1390, 1392 (8th Cir.
1969), the court held that the judge's failure to admonish the jury
not to discuss the case before it was submitted to them was harmless
error where the trial was completed in one day and the jury did not
actually discuss the case prior to submission.

Ij3. at 1391. The

instant case is distinguishable since the jury discussed the case
prior to submission.

Hence, the trial court's error in failing to

admonish the jury was not harmless.
Furthermore, in United States v. Williams, 635 F.2d 744
(8th Cir. 1980), the same court acknowledged that

ff

[i]t is essential

to a fair trial, civil or criminal, that a jury be cautioned as to
permissible conduct and conversations outside the jury room."
at 745-6.

Id.

The Williams court indicates a willingness to presume

prejudice where the trial court fails to admonish jurors before they
separate overnight.

Id. at 746. Although the trial in the instant

case lasted only one day, the trial court's failure to admonish
resulted in the case being discussed prior to submission.
People v. Diaz, 200 Cal. Rptr. 77 (Cal. App. 4 Dist.
1984) carried the Williams theory a step further.

The Diaz court

states that "a presumption of prejudice arises from any jury
misconduct.ff

Diaz at 82. The Court conceded the presumption is a

rebuttable presumption but cautioned that:
[i]n determining whether the presumption of
prejudice has been rebutted, it is clear that the
usual harmless error tests for determining the
prejudicial effect of an error are inapplicable.
Convincing evidence of guilt does not deprive a
defendant of the right to a fair trial since a fair
trial includes among other things the right to an
unbiased jury. . .
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Diaz at 82 (citations omitted; emphasis deleted).
In the case at bar Mr. Brown's constitutional rights were
violated by Juror Hogan's pre-submission deliberations and his
pre-disposed attitude of guilt toward the accused.

The comments

and/or attitude were significant enough that the jurors asked the
trial court whether their deliberations would be invalidated (R. 155
at p. 92). The trial court's refusal to inquire into the nature of
the "disturbing statements" further intensified the violation of
Mr. Brown's rights as did the trial court's ultimate finding of
harmless error (R. 156 at pp. 18-22, 30-31).
Accordingly, this Court should reverse the decision of
the trial court and remand the case for a new trial.
B.

THE EARLY DELIBERATION VIOLATED MR. BROWN'S
RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL BY AN IMPARTIAL JURY
UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF UTAH.

Article I, Sections 7 and 12 of the Constitution of Utah
are similar to the due process and impartial jury provisions in the
federal constitution.

The Utah rights are at least as persuasive as

the federal counterparts and occasionally may surpass them.

See

generally State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d 264 (Utah 1985) (Zimmerman, J.,
concurring); and State v. Early 716 P.2d 803, 806 (Utah 1986).

As

presented in Point II, the question of jury impartiality is an area
where the Utah Supreme Court has surpassed the federal protections
and presumes prejudice under certain circumstances.
at 279-81.
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Pike, 712 P.2d

The early deliberation question is also an issue which
implicates the right to be tried by an impartial jury and is an area
which the Utah Constitution should extend to protect. As when
jurors are seen speaking with witnesses (Pike), and when jurors fail
to truthfully answer voir dire questions (Point II, supra), the Utah
Constitution must presume prejudice when jurors engage in
pre-submission deliberations as occurred in this case.
Support for this argument is found in the Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure, Rule 17(j) which reads:
At each recess of the court, whether the jurors are
permitted to separate or are sequestered, they shall
be admonished by the court that it is their duty not
to converse among themselves or to converse with, or
suffer themselves to be addressed by, any other
person or any subject of the trial, and that it is
their duty not to form or express an opinion thereon
until the case is finally submitted to them.
Utah Code Ann. S77-35-17(j) (1953 as amended); see also Utah Code
Ann. §77-17-11 (1953 as amended).

The trial court and the jurors

violated Rule 17(j) in this case.

The trial court failed to

admonish the jurors during breaks (R. 155 at 87) and at lunch
(R. 155 at p. 54).
Because the trial court did not admonish them, the
jurors, in particular Juror Hogan, violated the rule.
The jurors themselves suspected that something was amiss
when they wrote the note inquiring as to the validity of their
decision after "some disturbing statements" had been made prior to
deliberations (R. 155 at p. 92). The trial court's admonishment was
then too late; the prejudice of early deliberations had already
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occurred.

The trial court erred in failing to inquire as to what

occurred, in failing to grant the motion for mistrial, and in
failing to grant the motion for a new trial.
Accordingly, this Court should reverse and remand this
case to the trial court for a new trial.
CONCLUSION
For any and all of the foregoing reasons, Mr. Brown
requests that this Court reverse his conviction for theft and remand
this case to the trial court with an order for either a dismissal of
the charges or a new trial.
DATED this

/

day of May, 1988.
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ADDENDUM A

IN THE T H I R D JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN A N D FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
^
Plaintiff,

JUDGMENT, SENTENCE
(COMMITMENT)

t_>y] „---"""'
Case No.

CJldl-lcz^

Clerk ^JnrrsH
u r H U-^Reporter g ^ t ^ O Bailiff 4 T L U W
Date
10^2*3'&7

Defendant.

D The motion of
to enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower category of offense and
impose sentence accordingly is D granted D denied. There being no legal or other reason why sentence
should not be imposed, and defendant having been convicted by D a jury; • the court; A plea of guilty;
• plea of no contest; of the offense of f ^ k r
, a felony
of the %rrX degree^a a class
misdemeanor, being now present in court and ready for sentence and
represented hy*4 l i w & r j c ^
and the State being represented hy K l H ^ ^ V ^ y ^ - i s now adjudged guilty
of the above offense, is now sentenced to a term in the Utah State Prison:
U
• to a maximum mandatory term of
years and which may be for life;
^ k n o t to exceed five years;
• of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years;
D of not less than five years and which may be for life;
• not to exceed
years;
c r 7 > oO
\ d and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $ 5 6 0 0 •
• and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $
to
D such sentence is to run concurrently with
• such sentence is to run consecutively with
D upon motion of D State, • Defense, D Court, Count(s)

•

are hereby dismissed.

w*& f i

Js Defendant is granted a stay of the above (^prison) sentence and placed on probation in the
custody of this Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adult
Parole for the period of 1 L) fVxcv^Tvv>^ t pursuant to the attached conditions of probation.
• Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake County • for delivery to the Utah State
Prison, Draper, Utah, or a for delivery to the Salt Lake County Jail, where defendant shall be confined
and imprisoned in accordance with this Judgment and Commitment.
• Commitment shall issue
DATED this ^ 3

day of

(

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

Y^ke
._
^ _ __.
DISTRICT^OURTJUU^E
. \
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Defense Counsel
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C
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f

S^mdS^L^

Deputy County Attorney
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U
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o n;

Judgment/State v.

worm—

i £ m Honorable

VCR

• ^ i

CONDITIONS OF PROBATION
D Usual and ordinary conditions required by the Dept. of Adult Probation & Parole.

Serve

^rtX »VUVC< Wv

/-

:

fi

.Vvoin the Salt Lake County Jail r.nmmpndng tAffW . I X t f U ' f f a y - " " t r r * ^ ^ r v ^ M
• Pay a fine in the amount of $
D at a rate to be determined by the Department of Adult Probation a^
Parole; or a at the rate of
D Pay restitution in the amount of $
_; or • in an amount to be determined by the Department of Adult
Probation and Parole; D at a rate of
; or • at a rate to be determined by
the Department of Adult Probation and Parole.
Enter, participate in, and complete any I v V
i2J2lki^==^program, counseling, or treatment as
n aftcd Parole. i / y N v /6> V w c w f C - > ^
directed by the Department of Adult Probation
• Enter, participate in, and complete the
program at
ML Participate in and complete any D educational; and/or {^vocational training £sas directed by the
Department of Adult Probation and Parole; ™»n'wiih r*f~PV€V^- 6 ^ f l ^ ^ ^
Participate in and complete any
training a as directed by the Department of Adult
Probation and Parole; or D with
Submit person, residence, and vehicle to search and seizure for the detection of drugs.
Submit to drug t e s t i n g . - a& h&yk
Z ' ^ v u ^ -#vr
VveeJo^
Not associate with anyone who illegally uses, sells, or otherwise distributes narcotics or drugs.
Not frequent any place where drugs are used, sold, or otherwise distributed illegally.
Not use or possess non-prescribed controlled substances.
D Refrain from the use of alcoholic beverages.
• Submit to testing for alcohol use.
Department^o{
Probatiop and
$nd Parole.
is directed by the Department
of Adult Probation
Parole
• Take antabuse • as
Obtain and maintair
in full-time employment. C4& K^s #/ \AJCLMJ
V
Maintain full-time er
smployment. tfl&r\h*d
H+v^rot^^ ^ i v ^ / p l c ^ ^ J
Tuii-time'^chooiing.
• Obtain and maintain
in full-time employment or full-time'schooling.
^
• Maintain full-time employment or obtain and maintain full-time schooling.
D Defendant is to have no contact nor associate with _ ,
under the Interstate Compact as approved
D Defendant's probation may be transferred to
by the Department of Adult Probation and Parole.
Complete
hours of community service restitution as directed by the Department of Adult Probation
and Parole.
days in jail.
hours of community service restitution in lieu of.
• Complete
Defendant
is
to
commit
no
crimes.
D
. for a review of this sentence
• Defendant is ordered to appear before this Court on

ft

•
•

l<t>,\ng*o 'McucU ^ Q ; W H &
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a
a
DATED this

23

day of

MsMx^
DISTRICT COUfTTJUDGE

Page

of

< ' '. ' i »"
H. D'-rrON h n v D L E Y

VUK—^

ADDENDUM B

w — , • .n,. r e ^^.tl CLERK'S OFFICE
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333 South Second East
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THEfevTJH«ir^rTjDIC]B?£,U DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY/ STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,

AFFIDAVIT

Plaintiff,
V.

Case No. CR87-1029

DAVID E. BROWN,
Defendant.

HONORABLE PAT BRIAN

I, -MrE&n BLAZHE, being first duly sworn according to law
on my oath depose and say:
1.

That I was one of the jurors in the trial on the

above-entitled matter.
2.

That during a recess, prior to deliberation,

statements were made during a recess that created an atmosphere of
prejudice against defendant.

One woman commented that the defense

attorney did not appear worried and Mr. Dave Hogan responded, "Well,
that guy doesn't matter."

Further, Mr. Hogan referred to him as

"that black man.11
3.

That such statements were made after the court

admonished the jurors to not discuss the case prior to deliberations
4.

Mr. David Hogan's statements and attitude were such

that he appeared to have pre-determined defendant's guilt. When I
J&nz. of kh** J urorj

advised

JUJ^KC;

fl£

that I would hate to be on trial to this jury,

jeanine Cobb agreed with me.

0001'} 8

5.

The foreperson of the jury/ Marilyn Williams, was

also concerned regarding statements and a note was sent to the court
requesting how to proceed.
6.

Further/ Mr. David Hoganf in discussing the case

during deliberations/ referred to experiences in his previous
employment in a retail store.
DATED this /^jj^7day of October/ 1987.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this

G97il day of

October, 1987.

IOTARY PUBLIC
Residing in Salt Lake County
My Commission Expires:
/ - / & - !

&

DELIVERED BY

OCT 1 3 1987
0. LOYOLA

000!,?9

1

JUROR NO, 13:

2

THE COURT:

Uh-huh (affirmative),

Did that experience in any way adversely

3

affect you so that you could not be fair and impartial if

4

selected as a juror today?

5

JUROR NO, 13:

6

THE COURT:

7

No, sir.

Anyone else had prior jury experience,

civil or criminal?

8

(No response.)

9

THE COURT:

10

indirectly in the retail sales business?

11
12

JUROR NO. 25:

THE COURT:

I was a security

When did you conclude your last day of

work as a security officer?

15
16

Marvin Bacon.

manager for Sears Roebuck for about eleven years.

13
14

Have any of you ever worked directly or

JUROR NO. 25:

1966.

I have been a peace officer

for Salt Lake City and for the State of Utah.

17

THE COURT:

Would those experiences prevent you

18

from being fair and impartial if selected as a juror in this

19

case?

20

JUROR NO. 25:

21

THE COURT:

22

JUROR NO. 3:

23
24
25

1968 to 1972.

No.

Anyone else in the retail?
I worked in college, for Sears, also,

It wouldn't bias me.

THE COURT:

Anyone else who has been involved in

retail sales of any kind?

36

JUROR NO. 23:

1
2

Wanda Pelton.

I worked for ZCMI in

1972 , 1973.
THE COURT

3

Would that experience in any way prevent

4

you from being fair and impartial if selected as a juror in

5

this case?

6

JUROR NO. 23:

No.

7

JUROR NO. 24:

When I was in high school I worked at

8

S. H . Chris and Company.
THE COURT:

9
10

That was 40 years ago.

Would that prevent you from being fair

and impartial in this case?

11

JUROR NO. 24:

12

JUROR NO. 6:

No.
Five years ago for about six months I

13

worked in a Cavanaugh's store.

14

THE COURT:

15

JUROR NO. 6:

16

THE COURT:

17

business in Bountiful?

18

JUROR NO. 6:

19

THE COURT:

20

In retail sales?
Yes.
That's the chocolate manufacturing

Yes•
Would that affect your impartiality in

any way?

21

JUROR NO. 6:

22

JUROR NO. 11:

23

No.
I worked at Auerbach's just as they

were closing out their store.
What was your last date of employment?

24

THE COURT:

25

JUROR NO. 11:

It was when Auerbach's closed, about

37

1
2
3

five years ago,
THE COURT-.

Would that: work experience affect your

impartiality if selected as a juror?

4

JUROR NO. 11:

5

THE COURT:

6

(No response.)

7

THE COURT:

No, sir.

Anyone else?

Do any of you have relatives or close

8

friends who have served as a security officer in a retail

9

sales business?

10

JUROR NO. 14:

11

THE COURT:

12

JUROR NO. 14:

13

J. C. Penney1s Company.

14

he was working there was about five years ago.

15

THE COURT:

Yes.

Please.
A cousin who was a security guard for
I am Marlowe Gwynn.

The last I knew

Would that relationship predispose you

16

to give more weight to security officers1 testimony than to

17

any other witnesses?

18

JUROR NO. 14:

19

THE COURT:

20

No.

Or to cause you to be biased or

prejudiced in any way?

21

JUROR NO. 14:

22

THE COURT:

No.

Would any of you give the testimony of a

23

police officer greater weight than any other witness by virtue

24

of the fact that he is a police officer?

25

that in determining what weight to give to any witness you

Do you understand

38

